| Schema | Profile | Identification | Membership Criteria (Exclusionism) | Pride | Hubris |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Week 11
Europe’s Far Right
Soci—229
Radical, Far-Right Parties Across the Pond–
November 10th
Reminders
Response Memo Deadline
This week’s response memo—which has to be between 250-400 words and posted on our Moodle Discussion Board—is due by 8:00 PM tonight.
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Final Paper Proposal Deadline
Your final paper proposals are due by 8:00 PM on Friday, November 21st.
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Another Invitation
Kellogg Lecture
Title
The Electric New Deal
Description
Click to Expand or Close
Scroll to access the entire description.
In 2021, Margot Lurie was the recipient of the Rufus B. Kellogg University Fellowship, one of the Amherst College Fellowships for graduate study, which is awarded for three years of graduate study to a recent graduate, and asks the recipient to return to campus to give a lecture or presentation.
Today, energy policy is a taken-for-granted site of national state intervention, yet this was not always the case. In this talk, Margot examines a moment when the American state worked to greatly expand its role in the almost entirely privately controlled energy system. During the New Deal, the federal government pursued a loose “National Power Policy”–a variety of institutional and legislative innovations intended to increase the supply and consumption of cheap electricity nationwide. Through an historical sociological study, Lurie asks why energy emerged as an object of state strategy and reflect on the enduring social, (geo)political, and environmental consequences of the National Power Policy.
Date and Time
Location
Another Invitation
If you attend the lecture, you do not have to
submit a response memo next week.
The Far Right’s Ascendance Across Europe
A Rising Tide
A Rising Tide
This is no longer the case.
A Rising Tide
Data From 2024
Source: Infogram
A Rising Tide
Note
The infogram uses the term hard right in lieu of far right.Let’s not do that.
Some Brief Case Studies
United Kingdom
You may have to the page to view the map.
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Does this represent a victory for the mainstream?
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Not exactly.
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Some Brief Case Studies
The Netherlands
Some Brief Case Studies
Germany, France, Sweden
Some Brief Case Studies
For a more detailed portrait, refer to
Politico’s Poll of Polls in Europe.
Group Discussion I
Reviewing Far Right Ideology
Golder’s (2016) article begins by mapping the ideological foundations of the European far right party family (cf. Rydgren 2007). This should, in a sense, be a review of material we’ve already covered in class.
Reviewing Far Right Ideology
… and thus, presents an opportunity for a group discussion.
Reviewing Far Right Ideology
In groups of 3-4, complete the following tasks:
Compare the extreme right to the radical right: i.e., what brings them together and what sets them apart? Why do “radical” and “extreme” right parties fall under the far right umbrella?
Discuss how Golder (2016) links populism, nationalism and fascism
to the European far right party family.Clarify what Rydgren (2007) means by ethnopluralism.
A Conceptual Framework
(Mudde 2007)
The Challenge of Circularity
In defining what is still most often called the “extreme right” party family, one is faced with the problem of circularity: we have to decide on the basis of which post facto criteria we should use to define the various parties, while we need a priori criteria to select the parties that we want to define. In other words, whether we select as representatives of the party family in question the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and the Norwegian Fremmskrittpartiet (Progress Party, FRP) or the Italian Movimento Sociale–Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement– Tricolor Flame, MS-FT) and the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) will have a profound effect on the ideological core that we will find, and thus on the terminology we will employ.
(Mudde 2007, 13, EMPHASIS ADDED)
The Challenge of Circularity
Some analytic solutions to this “problem of circularity” include:
- Gauging Family Resemblances
- Developing Ideal-Types
- Finding Prototypes
- Isolating the Lowest Common Denominator
- Isolating the “Greatest Common Denominator”
The Ideological Core
The European Far Right’s Core
[T]he aim of the minimum definition is to describe the core features of the ideologies of all parties that are generally included in the party family.
(Mudde 2007, 15, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Some Review
A Question
What animates the far right’s ideological core?The European Far Right’s Core
If one looks at the primary literature of the various political parties generally associated with this party family, as well as the various studies of their ideologies, the core concept is undoubtedly the “nation.” This concept also certainly functions as a “coathanger” for most other ideological features. Consequently, the minimum definition of the party family should be based on the key concept, the nation. The first ideological feature to address, then, is nationalism.
(Mudde 2007, 16, EMPHASIS ADDED)
More Review
Well, we’ve grappled with this phenomenon before.
More Review
What type of nationalist (cf. Soehl and Karim 2021) would gravitate towards the European far right?
Group Discussion II
Towards a Unified Definitional Framework
In groups of 3-4, answer the following questions:
Mudde (2007) argues that nativism is the specific mode or expression of nationalism most relevant for understanding far right politics in Europe. To wit, it serves as the far right’s centre of gravity. Why? Do Bonikowski et al. (2021) agree? Here’s a hint.
What’s Mudde’s (2007) maximum definition of the European far right party family? Does Mudde’s (2007) definition align with the definitions provided by Rydgren (2007) and Golder (2016)?
How does Mudde (2007) conceptualize the populist radical right? Specifically, how does he understand concepts like radical and right?
Why the Rising Tide?
Demand Side Explanations
Modernization Grievances
Several studies link far right success to the grievances that arise during the modernization process. The underlying premise in these studies is that there is a small amount of latent support for far right values in all industrial societies. Although this support remains latent under normal conditions, it can be politicized and mobilized during moments of extreme crisis that are related to the modernization process. The typical story is a social-psychological one in which individuals who are unable to cope with rapid and fundamental societal change—the modernization losers—turn to the far right.
(Golder 2016, 482–83, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Modernization Grievances
The modernization losers thesis … has been one of the central tenets in the literature on the new radical right-wing parties … Minkenberg (2003, 151), for instance, argues that the rise of new radical right-wing parties can be understood as “the radical effort to undo” social change associated with modernization, that is, “a growing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role flexibility) and ongoing functional differentiation of the society (segmentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems).” The ethnonationalistically defined, homogeneous community and the virtue of traditional roles stressed by the new radical right constitute appealing counterweights for people who do not feel at home in a modernizing society.
(Rydgren 2007, 248, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Modernization Grievances
Scholars home-in on different aspects of modernization theoretically linked to far right ascendancy—including:
Globalization
Anomie and the Fraying of Social Attachments
The Rise of Post-Materialist Values
Evidence connecting these macrostructural transformations—ignited by modernizing processes—to far right voting has been mixed
(see Golder 2016; Rydgren 2007).
Economic Grievances
Scholars who link economic grievances to far right success typically do so in the context of realistic conflict theory (Campbell 1965). In times of economic scarcity, social groups with conflicting material interests compete over limited resources. Under these conditions, members of the ingroup are apt to blame the outgroup for economic problems, engendering prejudice and discrimination. Far right parties can exploit these economic grievances by linking immigrants and minorities to economic hardship through slogans such as “Eliminate Unemployment: Stop Immigration.”
(Golder 2016, 483, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Economic Grievances
There is considerable evidence in support of the economic grievance story at the individual level. The characteristics of the typical far right voter … describe an individual who is likely to find himself competing with immigrants in the economic sphere. Such individuals are also associated with holding stronger anti-immigrant attitudes.
(Golder 2016, 484, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Economic Grievances
Yet, “the evidence linking far right support to the economic context in which individuals form their preferences is more mixed”
(Golder 2016, 484).
Economic Grievances
A Question
Why?That is, why are ecological and individual-level associations between macroeconomic indicators and far right voting highly contingent?
Cultural Grievances
Scholars who link cultural grievances to far right success typically do so in the context of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). At its core, social identity theory assumes that individuals have a natural tendency to associate with similar individuals, and that an inherent desire for self-esteem causes people to perceive their ingroup as superior to outgroups. Far right parties are able to exploit and encourage these natural tendencies by highlighting the (alleged) incompatibility of immigrant behavioral norms and cultural values with those of the native population.
(Golder 2016, 485, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Cultural Grievances
There is strong support for the cultural grievance story at the individual level. Multiple studies have shown that anti-immigrant attitudes are positively related to far right support … This in itself should not be read as support for the cultural grievance story, as anti-immigrant attitudes may be the result of economic, as opposed to cultural, concerns with immigration. Attempts to distinguish between these two possibilities, however, indicate that economic and cultural concerns matter for anti-immigrant attitudes.
(Golder 2016, 485, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Cultural Grievances
As Golder (2016) clarifies, anti-immigrant attitudes don’t always lead to far right voting. Similarly, the local immigrant context does not always influence radical voting patterns in Europe (cf. Rydgren 2007).
Why?
Group Discussion III
Demand Side Explanations
More Explanations and Theorizing Radicalization–
November 12th
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Final Paper Proposal Deadline
Your final paper proposals are due by 8:00 PM on Friday, November 21st.
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Reminders
Final Paper Proposal
Reminders
Kellogg Lecture
Title
The Electric New Deal
Description
Click to Expand or Close
Scroll to access the entire description.
In 2021, Margot Lurie was the recipient of the Rufus B. Kellogg University Fellowship, one of the Amherst College Fellowships for graduate study, which is awarded for three years of graduate study to a recent graduate, and asks the recipient to return to campus to give a lecture or presentation.
Today, energy policy is a taken-for-granted site of national state intervention, yet this was not always the case. In this talk, Margot examines a moment when the American state worked to greatly expand its role in the almost entirely privately controlled energy system. During the New Deal, the federal government pursued a loose “National Power Policy”–a variety of institutional and legislative innovations intended to increase the supply and consumption of cheap electricity nationwide. Through an historical sociological study, Lurie asks why energy emerged as an object of state strategy and reflect on the enduring social, (geo)political, and environmental consequences of the National Power Policy.
Date and Time
Location
Reminders
If you attend the lecture, you do not have to
submit a response memo next week.
Quick Updates
What will the next few weeks look like?
Why the Rising Tide?
Supply Side Explanations
Political Fields, Parties and Entrepreneurs
Supply side explanations for the rising tide of the European far right include—but are certainly not limited to—party organization, winning ideologies, and political opportunity structures.
Political Fields, Parties and Entrepreneurs
Let’s focus on the latter.
Political Opportunity Structures
Political opportunity structures reflect a set of exogenous forces—or environmental constraints—that regulate political movement and strategic pursuits within a specific political field.
Political Opportunity Structures
These exogenous factors include, but are not limited to:
Electoral Rules
Party Competition
The Media
Political Cleavage Structures
Political Opportunity Structures
Electoral rules are the primary institutional factor shaping the political opportunity structure confronting far right parties … Disproportional systems mechanically translate votes into seats in a way that penalizes small parties. This mechanical effect further hurts small parties by creating incentives for voters and elites to engage in strategic behavior … Many scholars have applied this framework to examine whether variation in far right success is related to electoral system permissiveness.
(Golder 2016, 486, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Rather than evaluate party competition in purely spatial terms, scholars have recently argued that it is also necessary to examine it in terms of issue salience and issue ownership … Issue ownership is important because voters take account of whether a party is the most credible proponent of a particular issue when casting their ballot … Issue salience and issue ownership can be manipulated. According to Meguid (2007), mainstream parties can adopt three strategies toward the far right: dismissive, accommodative, or adversarial. A dismissive strategy involves ignoring the issues raised by far right parties so as to convince voters that they are not salient. An accommodative strategy involves adopting a similar position to that of far right parties … (And) an adversarial strategy involves adopting a policy position that conflicts with that of far right parties.
(Golder 2016, 487, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Several researchers have suggested that the mass media play a pivotal role in the emergence of new radical right-wing parties. As Koopmans (2004, 8) has argued, for instance, the “action of gatekeepers [within the mass media] produce the first and most basic selection mechanism . . . visibility.” The media also play a role in their own right, by taking part in agenda-setting and framing of political issues. There also seems to be a growing tendency to personalize issues within the media, which may benefit parties like the new radical right-wing parties that give the party leader a pronounced central role (Eatwell 2003, 2005). With the increasing struggle for readers and viewers that has resulted from new technologies and from the growing privatization of mass media in many countries, the media have exhibited a stronger tendency to focus on the most scandalous aspects of politics, which may contribute to antiestablishment sentiment (Mudde 2004).
(Rydgren 2007, 255, EMPHASIS ADDED)
If a country’s political cleavage structure is stable, there is little room for new parties to enter the system. If the political cleavage structure changes, though, either because new cleavages emerge or because the relative salience of existing cleavages changes, then this creates niches that new parties can exploit … Historically, European party systems have been dominated by the economic (class) cleavage. Societal change, in particular the transition to a postindustrial society, has reduced the salience of the economic cleavage relative to the cultural one in some countries (Inglehart 1977; Ignazi 2006). When existing parties were slow to adapt to this, a niche emerged that new parties on the far left (Kitschelt 1988) and far right (Kitschelt 1997) were able to exploit (Rydgren 2005). This account ties far right party success to a realignment in Europe’s political cleavage structure (Cole 2005).
(Golder 2016, 488, EMPHASIS ADDED)
A Note on Political Geography
Spatial Distribution of Radicalism
As Golder (2016, 491) argues, “[m]uch can be learned from the political geography of far right support.”
Consider the 2025 German Elections
Scroll to view select maps
Or the 2022 French Presidential Elections
Group Discussion IV
Comparing Political Fields
In groups of 3-4, compare and contrast political opportunity structures in Europe and the U.S. Do you think America’s political field is more or less hospitable to far right politics vis-à-vis Europe’s?
The Normalization of
the Far Right
The Role of Norms
If anti-radical-right norms are strong, radical-right voters will often not express their preferences in public, and radical-right politicians will be less skilled. This is what I have called the latency equilibrium. If these norms are weak, more skilled politicians self-select into politics with a radical-right platform, and more radical-right voters feel comfortable publicly expressing their radical-right preferences. This is what I have called the surfacing equilibrium. Societies can move from one equilibrium to another via an activation phase. In this phase, political entrepreneurs sense that there is more latent support for radical-right policy than they had anticipated. As a consequence, they are willing to enter politics with the counternormative ideology and mobilize its latent societal support.
(Valentim 2024, 189, EMPHASIS ADDED)
The Role of Norms
[T]he latency phase represents a stable equilibrium. The norm in place keeps radical-right support latent and often unobservable … As a consequence, radical-right platforms are led by politicians who cannot fully mobilize the latent support for radical-right policy … [F]or this equilibrium to be overcome, societies need to move to the second stage in the process of normalization: the activation phase. For activation to come about, two conditions are necessary. First, an outgroup threat trigger momentarily loosens the norm and makes some individuals willing to publicly express their counternormative views. Second, a skilled political entrepreneur, who takes this cue, enters politics with a radical-right platform, and activates silent radical-right preferences in their society.
(Valentim 2024, 203–4, EMPHASIS ADDED)
The Role of Norms
After the trigger impels a political entrepreneur to run for election on a stigmatized party platform, societies may be tipped toward a new equilibrium. If the entrepreneur makes an electoral breakthrough, their success erodes the anti-radical-right norm and makes radical-right preferences surface … In the latency equilibrium, politicians with radical-right views had an incentive not to run for election on the stigmatized platform … As the entrepreneur becomes successful, however, their calculations are likely to change. Radical-right politicians realize that one can be successful running with a radical-right platform, and become more likely to join one. This represents the third and final phase in the process of radical-right normalization: the surfacing equilibrium.
(Valentim 2024, 213–14, EMPHASIS ADDED)
The Role of Norms
A Question
How does Valentim (2024) deploy this framework to understand the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany?A Conceptual Model
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
Why do we need to theorize
the radicalization of mainstream parties?
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
Consider the times.
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
The far right entered a fourth wave in the twenty-first century, electorally and politically profiting from three “crises”: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (and beyond), the Great Recession of 2008, and the “refugee crisis” of 2015. All the western democracies were affected, albeit in different ways, shaking the national and international political status quo, and giving rise to an unprecedented wave of Islamophobic and populist protest.
(Mudde 2019, 20, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
What characterizes the fourth wave, and differentiates it from the third wave, is the mainstreaming of the far right. While far-right politics was largely considered out of bounds for mainstream parties and politicians after 1945, with some notable exceptions … this is no longer the case today. In more and more countries, populist radical right parties and politicians are considered koalitionsfähig (acceptable for coalitions) by mainstream right, and sometimes even left, parties. Moreover, populist radical right (and even some extreme right) ideas are openly debated in mainstream circles, while populist radical right policies are adopted, albeit it generally in (slightly) more moderate form, by mainstream parties.
(Mudde 2019, 20–21, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
Another characteristic of the fourth wave is the heterogeneity of the far right, even within the subgroup of successful political parties. While the usual suspects still constitute the core - that is, the populist radical right parties that emerge from outside the political mainstream - they are complemented by a dizzying array of new far-right parties. The most important are transformed conservative parties, such as the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland.
(Mudde 2019, 21, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
… or America’s Grand Old Party?
Why Theorize Mainstream Radicalization?
Moving Beyond Nominalist Models of Party Politics
Far Right Typicality
Absent major political realignments, a party’s mainstream or radical bona fides are often treated as essential (i.e., time-invariant) traits that are set in stone—even as mainstream parties inch rightwards and radical parties anchor governing coalitions.
Far Right Typicality
Far Right Typicality
Nominalist treatments of party politics
are part of a deeper problem.
Far Right Typicality
[T]he categories social scientists use in our research belie the inherent fuzziness and vagueness of our most commonly used and important concepts. In many, if not most, cases, no particular feature is a common element in defining a concept. Rather, there are only family resemblances—criss-crossing patterns of similarities between different members.
(Monk 2022, 9, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Far Right Typicality
A Random (Yet Relevant) Question
How would you explain what a bird is?Far Right Typicality
[C]onsider the immense heterogeneity of features possessed by members of the category “bird” … A prototypical bird, for instance, may be of a certain size (relatively small), have feathers and a beak, be able to fly and lay eggs, and so on. These features, in turn, are weighted in terms of importance to the prototype. Clusters of key categorical cues and the relations between these cues are known as prototypes—abstract summary representations of “best examples” of a concept … Flight, for instance, may be weighted more heavily than feathers. Even the relations between features may be weighted. Having feathers and a beak may be more important than a potential bird’s size and its ability to lay eggs. These features, the sets of properties we associate with a term, are called intensions and form the foundation of human thought.
(Monk 2022, 9, EMPHASIS ADDED)
Far Right Typicality
My contention: we can think of party politics through this lens, too—and focus on far right typicality in lieu of nominal membership in the
far right party family.
Far Right Typicality
Another Question
How can this framework help us track or measuremainstream radicalization?
Far Right Typicality
There Are Other Benefits, Too
Karim and Lukk’s The Radicalization of Mainstream Parties in the 21st Century
Explaining Mainstream Radicalization in Europe
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
[S]everal scholars have turned their attention to the … question of the effect of radical right success on the behavior of other parties. The main focus in this line of research lies on the potentially ‘contagious’ effect of radical right parties, i.e. the question if their success causes other parties to adopt more anti-immigrant and culturally protectionist positions.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020, 830, EMPHASIS ADDED)
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
If … (radical right) parties gain representation in parliament we observe a strong move towards an anti-immigrant stance by other political parties. These findings have important implications … First, they show that the radical right as an actor plays a fundamental role in the politicization of the immigration issue — they do not simply constitute a symptom of a larger development. Second, they demonstrate that the transformation of the political space in Western Europe … is not simply a reaction to shifting preferences of the European electorate, but is a result of the strategic interaction of political parties. Third, in relation to a more general literature on party competition they underline that parties do not only follow shifts on the demand side of the electoral market, but react to other parties’ behavior.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020, 843–44, EMPHASIS ADDED)
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
Thus, far right parties are not simply outgrowths of sociocultural cleavages in greater society—they can create fault-lines themselves and restructure the topography of the political field
(cf. Eidlin 2016).
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
How does the mainstream European right respond?
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
Amplifying Anti-Immigrant Discourse
Figure 3.7 from Abou-Chadi and Krause (2021).
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
Although anti-immigrant shifts constitute a ‘double-edged sword’ for the mainstream right as they run into the danger of making the views of the far right socially acceptable … they tend to tighten policy proposals in order to remedy electoral losses to the radical right and win back vote switchers.
(Abou-Chadi and Krause 2021, 86, EMPHASIS ADDED)
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
Yet Another Question
Do you think this is an effective strategy?How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
[W]e investigate one of the core questions within the research on radical right success: Do accommodative strategies help to weaken RRPs electorally? Our analyses do not provide any evidence that adopting more anti-immigrant positions reduces the radical right’s support. Combining macro- and micro-level evidence, we can demonstrate that this does not mean that voters are generally unresponsive to party repositioning. To the contrary, accommodative policy shifts by mainstream parties tend to catalyze voter transfers between mainstream parties and RRPs. While some of these transitions cancel out in aggregation, the radical right, if anything, seems to be the net beneficiary of this exchange.
(Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2023, 178, EMPHASIS ADDED)
How Right-Wing Radicalism Spreads
Figure 1 from Krause, Cohen and Abou-Chadi (2023).
Group Discussion V
Radicalization in America?
In groups of 3-4, discuss whether the Republican Party is radicalizing—and what that means in the American context.
In developing your argument(s), refer to work on political opportunity structures (cf. Golder 2016; Rydgren 2007), Mudde’s (2007) minimum and maximum definitions of the far right party family, and today’s discussion of far right typicality.
See You Monday
References
Note: Scroll to access the entire bibliography
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———. 2021. “The Supply Side: Mainstream Right Party Policy Positions in a Changing Political Space in Western Europe.” In Riding the Populist Wave: Europe’s Mainstream Right in Crisis, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Tim Bale, 67–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009006866.004.
Bonikowski, Bart, Yuval Feinstein, and Sean Bock. 2021. “The Partisan Sorting of ‘America’: How Nationalist Cleavages Shaped the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.” American Journal of Sociology 127 (2): 492–561. https://doi.org/10.1086/717103.
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———. 2005. “Charisma and the Revival of the European Extreme Right.” In Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World, edited by Jens Rydgren. New York: Nova Publishers.
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———. 1997. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. University of Michigan Press.
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Krause, Werner, Denis Cohen, and Tarik Abou-Chadi. 2023. “Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties.” Political Science Research and Methods 11 (1): 172–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.8.
Meguid, Bonnie M. 2007. Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510298.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2003. “The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization.” Comparative European Politics 1 (2): 149–70. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110017.
Monk, Ellis P. 2022. “Inequality Without Groups: Contemporary Theories of Categories, Intersectional Typicality, and the Disaggregation of Difference.” Sociological Theory 40 (1): 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751221076863.
Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition 39 (4): 541–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.
———. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037.
———. 2019. The Far Right Today. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Rydgren, Jens. 2005. “Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family.” European Journal of Political Research 44 (3): 413–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00233.x.
———. 2007. “The Sociology of the Radical Right.” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (Volume 33, 2007): 241–62. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.
Soehl, Thomas, and Sakeef M. Karim. 2021. “How Legacies of Geopolitical Trauma Shape Popular Nationalism Today.” American Sociological Review 86 (3): 406–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224211011981.
Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33–47. Key Readings in Social Psychology. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Valentim, Vicente. 2024. The Normalization of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand. Oxford Studies in Democratization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
